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DOWER AND CURTESY-DEFEASANCE OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE BY CONDITIONAL LIMITATION
The husband of Defendant died seized of a one-third undivided
•ititerest in a tract of land, defeasible by an executory devise over on
his dying without issue. Decedent had no issue. Plaintiffs as interested parties brought suit for an adjudication of the rights of the
parties in the realty and for partition. The widow's petition asserted
that she was entitled to dower in the defeasible fee of vhich her
husband died seized, and her contention was upheld. On appeal,
held, affirmed. Snidow et el. v. Snidow, 192 Va. 60, 63 S.E. 2nd
620 (1951).
Does the determination of a fee simple defeasible estate by
operation of an executory devise defeat the right of the surviving
spouse to dower or curtesy? The recent Virginia case of Snidow v.
Snidow, supra, involving dower, so held. All but one' of the Virginia cases directly in point are concerned with dower; but the
principle applicable to dower is applicable to curtesy, "...
which
'2
seems to be conceded on all sides.
The present line of Virgina decisions is based upon the leading
'English case of Buckworth v. Thirkell,3 decided in 1785. In that
case Lord Mansfield held that the right of the husband to curtesy
was not defeated. As was pointed out in a notable treatise, 4 "At
the threshold of this inquiry it may be worth remembering that
Lord Mansfield was a Scotch lawyer whose training had stressed
the Civil Law, and that his reputation for greatness was earned in
the fields of marine insurance and commercial law rather than in
th field of property law. His pronouncements in the law of land
frequently 'occasioned some noise in the profession' as Lord Alvanley 5 said this particular decision did."
Lord Mansfield dealt with the problem in almost the same
manner as the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has: He
simply defined tenancy by the curtesy in a general way and applied
the facts of the case, which he regarded as of the first impression,
to the letter of his definition, concluding without further relevant
1.
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5.

Taliaferro v. BurweU, 4 Call 321 (Va. 1803).
Jones et ux. v. Hughes, 27 Gratt. 560 (Va. 1876).
Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 652, 127 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) note
(a) p. 351 (KB. 1785).
RSsTATmMENT, NopmRTy, Dower and Curtesy as Derivative Estates,

Vol. 1 Ap. 5 (1936).

Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 643, 127 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 347 (1804).

rationale :6 "During the life of the wife she continued seized of a fee
simple to which her issue might by possibility inherit. I am of
opinion, that the Defendant is entitled to be tenant by the curtesy."
In one of the monographs in the Appendix of the RESTATEMENT it is pointed out that this reasoning is contrary to the reasoning applied to dower cases involving purchase money mortgages
7
and vendors' liens.
It is difficult to find any strong reason to support the proposition that dower should be allowed in realty which does not go to
the deceased's heirs or to the devisees under his will, but to the
ones designated by the grantor of the fee simple defeasible.
1. It has not been seriously argued in Virginia that it was the
intention of the creator of the estate to permit dower; in no case
has there been evidence to support such a view. Dower and curtesy
are imposed by law on estates of inheritance and are not created by
contract. Therefore, in the consideration of dower or curtesy the intention of the original grantor is not controlling; public policy
should be the major concern.
2. There is no good reason founded on public policy for the
result reached in the Buckworth case. In Jones v. Hughes, supra,
at 565 it was said that since the widow should have dower if the
decedent died with issue, " . . . there would seem to be no good
reason why the husband's estate should not be prolonged, so as to
give the right of dower in the one case as well as in the other,
particularly as it is allowed to estates tail under similar circumstances . . ." It is suggested that a very good reason against the
prolongation theory is found in the fact that estate of the decedent cannot be added to for the benefit of his widow without
subtracting from the estate of the devisee over. The principle of
dower and curtesy is based upon the marriage-of the decedent and
the surviving spouse: Dower is an extension of the duty of a husband to support his wife; curtesy has its origin in the common law
unity of man and wife. There is no marriage bond between the
devisee over and the decedent's wife; and there is no duty on the
part of the devisee over, who might be a total stranger, to support
the decedent's wife, any more than it is the duty of any other property owner to do so. It seems unjust to require one to assume an
obligation of another's marriage.
6. Buckworth v. Thirkell, sapra, Reprint at 353.
7. RiBsTATEmoNT PRoPERTY, supra, at 6.

The general rule is that dower and curtesy are derivative in
nature. The exceptions to this rule-the fee tail, prior to 1776 in
Virginia, and perhaps the fee conditional, prior to 1285-were
based on the following reason: "In that country [England] from
the fifteenth century on, so great a part of the land was entailed,
and so large a part of the provision for the surviving spouse consisted of land rights passing as dower or curtesy that it was felt
necessary to give to the surviving spouse of a tenant in tail a right
to either dower or curtesy superior to all remainders, executory
interests and reversions." 8 When the reason for the rule ceases the
rule should cease; yet in this instance the rule as to fees tail has
been kept alive and extended by an unusual use of analogies. Butler
wrote of the Buckworth case, "It may therefore seem singular that
the court, on this occasion, should prefer reasoning by way of
analogy from the only admitted exception to the general rule
(estates in fee tail) to reasoning by analogy from the general rule
itself." 9
3. The doctrine of stare decisis is used in support of the most
recent Virginia cases. Buckworth v. Thirkell is cited. In 1876
Jones v. Hughes, supra and Medley v. Medley,10 cases decided on
the same day, followed the leading English case. In Jones v. Hughes
the court said at 562, "And the same was held by this court a few
years after [Buckworth v. Thirkell] in Taliaferro v. Burwell. No
reference is made by the court in its decision, or by the council in
argument, to the above decision of Lord Mansfield, which was probably not then known here." The Taliaferro case, supra, and the
English case of Moody v. King" cite LITTLETON § 53, 2 Bac.
Ab. 223 in their support of the prolongation theory. This section of
LITTLETON defines dower and states the special rule applied
to estates in fee tail; hence it is no more in point than any other
authority that gives the general definition of dower that is accepted
by all. One is tempted to ask, as does Wigmore in a comparable
situation, "Is it not strange how slow some judges are to get out of
the self-imposed bondage of precedents ?"12
Minor gives the view of Virginia and the majority of Ameri8.
9.
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RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, s:upa, at 13, 14.
BUTLER, COKE ON LrrTLEToN, note 241(a), as quoted in RE TATEMENT, PROPERTY, saupra, at 7.

Medley v. Medley, 27 Gratt. 568 (Va. 1876).
Moody v. King, 2 Bing. 447, 130 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 378 (C.P. 1825).
12. 5 WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1476 n.: (3rd Ed. 1940).

13
can jurisdictions, citing the Tal4erro; Jones, and Medley cases.
In the United States at least eleven states1 4 follow the view taken
in the Buckworth case. Three states are opposed. 15 Although the
majority view has been described as "undoubtedly correct," 1 6 the
authorities are greatly divided. The American Law Institute' 7 and
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM' 8 support the minority view.
Chancellor Kent wrote in support of the minority view, advocating
its adoption, 19 "The subject is replete with perplexed refinements,
and it is involved too deep in mystery and technical subtleties to be
sufficiently intelligible for practical use. Here arises a proper case for
the aid of the reformer. When any particular branch of the law has
departed widely from clear and simple rules, or, by the use of
artificial and redundant distinctions, has become uncertain and
almost incomprehensible, there is no effectual relief but from the
potent hand of the lawgiver."
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